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INTRODUCTION

Article III authorizes and the Judicial Code grants federal subject matterjurisdiction
over civil cases "arising under" federal law. The Supreme Court has interpreted these
words differently, however, in their constitutional and statutory contexts.' While the
constitutional text is read broadly, the Court has imposed three limitations on the same
words in the statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction: 2 (1) the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule; 3 (2) a requirement that the federal issues be sufficiently "direct" or

t

Copyright 2007 Richard D. Freer. All rights reserved.
* Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. Visiting Professor, The
George Washington University Law School, 2006-07. I have benefited from comments by
Thomas Arthur, Kevin Clermont, Chip Lupu, Todd Peterson, Peter Raven-Hansen, Martin
Redish, Amanda Tyler, Roger Trangsrud, and Joan Schaffner, and from workshops at Emory
and George Washington. No doubt I have strayed despite the guidance of these good people.
1. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986)
("Although the constitutional meaning of 'arising under' may extend to all cases in which a
federal question is 'an ingredient' of the action, we have long construed the statutory grant of
federal question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power." (quoting Osborn v. Bank of
U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824))).
2. The general federal question statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). Other specialized
grants of federal question jurisdiction also employ the "arising under" language, and the Court
has generally equated the interpretation of the phrase in these other statutes in the same manner
as § 133 1. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
830 (2002) (equating statutory "arising under" standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 for patent cases
with that established for claims invoking § 133 1). For convenience, I will refer only to § 133 1.
3. This requires that the federal issues on which subject matter jurisdiction is based appear
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"central ' 4 to the dispute to justify access to the federal courts; and (3) a requirement
that the federal assertion be "substantial." ' These limitations are meant to filter those
cases that should invoke lower federal court jurisdiction from those that should not.
My primary focus is the second limitation-the centrality requirement-which has
long vexed courts and commentators. 6 The Supreme Court sent conflicting signals
regarding centrality in the first third of the twentieth century and then ignored the topic
for fifty years.7 When it returned to the issue in 1986, in MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson,8 a sharply divided Court created more debate than certainty,
particularly on the question of when (if ever) a state-created claim might invoke federal
question jurisdiction. In 2005, the Court revisited the topic and issued a unanimous
opinion in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing.9 This case addresses significant questions and concerns raised by
courts and commentators in the wake of Merrell Dow and throughout the Court's
tortured treatment of the centrality requirement.
Why has the Court had such difficulty with centrality? I believe it is because
Justices have been animated by different views of the purpose of federal question
jurisdiction. Some, notably Justice Holmes in the early twentieth century and the
majority of Justices in MerrellDow, seem to have embraced a narrow view, in which
as an essential part of plaintiff's claim. See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY C. PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 249-52 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing requirement as one of

"centrality"); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise
"'Directly" UnderFederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890 (1967). The Supreme Court has recently
referred to this area as the "centrality of the federal issue." Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc.
v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2136 n.5 (2006).
5. More precisely, the federal assertion must not be "so patently without merit" that the
court rejects it as frivolous. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535, 542-43 (1974). Though this
requirement is stated in jurisdictional terms, it appears to be aimed at the merits of the case.
Thus, a dismissal on substantiality grounds may be essentially a dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). As the Supreme Court said most recently:
"A claim invoking federal question jurisdiction... may be dismissed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is 'immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction' or is 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous."' Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126
S. Ct. 1235, 1244 n.10 (2006) (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 678). Throughout this Article, I will
assume that the substantiality requirement is satisfied.
6. "The most difficult single problem in determining whether federal question jurisdiction
exists is deciding when the relationship of the federal law to a case is such that the action may
be said to be one 'arising under' that law." 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 17-18 (2d ed. 1984). "[I]t

cannot be said that any clear test has yet been developed to determine which cases 'arise under'
federal law." Id. § 3562, at 19. See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d
1202, 1205 (referring to the centrality requirement generally as "the Serbonian bog").
7. I will discuss the principal cases in Part III of this Article. The fifty-year hiatus was

between Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) and Merrell Dow Pharms.
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
8. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
9. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed
the possibility of the Court's adopting in a later case the test set forth by Justice Holmes, which

is discussed in Part III.A of this Article. Id at 320-21 (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra note
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the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction provides a federal forum only for the
vindication of federally created rights.' 0 Others, however, notably Justice Brennan in
his dissent in Merrell Dow, envision a broader role. While they agree that federal
question jurisdiction is necessary for the vindication of federal rights, they also believe
it should provide lower federal fora" for the consistent and sympathetic interpretation
of federal law. 12 This difference in view clashes dramatically when a state-created
claim implicates issues of federal law. The Holmes approach holds that no federal
forum is needed, because no federal claim is being vindicated. The broader view is
open to the possibility that federal question jurisdiction ought to be available to
interpret or apply federal law. In Grable, the Court embraces the broader view of
federal question jurisdiction and finally provides meaningful guidance for assessing
when state-created claims may invoke federal question jurisdiction.
In my opinion, the Court does this by recognizing-implicitly, I admit-the
difference between a rule and a standard. A rule affords the decisionmaker no
discretion, but cabins its inquiry to whether a given set of facts exists.' 3 A standard, in
contrast, affords the decisionmaker greater discretion by prescribing a series of
relevant factors to be weighed in view of a policy goal.14 In illuminating the difference,
we benefit by juxtaposing the centrality requirement with the well-pleaded complaint
rule. The latter performs a task well-suited to a rule-it asks a question that can be
answered yes or no. The centrality requirement, however, asks a fundamentally
different kind of question-how much federal content is required to invoke
jurisdiction. This sort of question is best addressed by a less determinate standard,
which requires the court to balance federal and state interests and to consider, among

10. See Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 225 (1948) ("The federal courts do not sit to give material for

LAW

law review articles. Their business is the vindication of rights conferred by federal law.").
11. Recognition of federal question jurisdiction provides not only a federal trial forum, but
also the possibility of appeal to the appropriate federal court of appeals. Thus,jurisdiction under
§ 1331 permits two layers of consideration by Article III judges--one for adjudication and
another for correction of errors. Refusal to recognize federal question jurisdiction relegates
litigants to the state courts, with the possibility of Article III review on federal matters only if
the Supreme Court agrees to review the determination of the highest state court. Such review is
a long shot. See infra notes 52, 137 and accompanying text.
12. See RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 191 (2006) ("Federal
judges may be expected to develop special expertise in matters of federal law, and might also be
more sympathetic to the policies underlying federal law."); 15 MARTIN H. REDISH, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE §

103.31 [3][a],at 103-38 (3d ed. 2005) ("[A] significant-if not primary-

purpose for providing federal question jurisdiction is to take advantage of the federal courts'
expertise on matters of federal law .... ").
13. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
14. I realize that there is vast literature and substantial debate on the subject of rules versus
standards. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal PrecisionofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofLegalRulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An EconomicAnalysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and

Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992). For our purposes, it is sufficient to use the definitions
laid out in the text, which reflect most directly the views of Judge Posner and Dean Sullivan.
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other things, what I will call "litigation reality"-that is, what issues must be resolved
if the underlying dispute is adjudicated.
Thus Holmes's view of federal question jurisdiction-that it exists to provide a
federal trial forum for vindication of federally-created claims--erred by applying a rule
(which I will call the "Holmes test") for an assessment that requires the subtlety of a
standard. Like the Holmes test, the Grablestandard for centrality may be a product of
its time. It implicitly recognizes that today-perhaps unlike when Holmes wrote-case
load makes it impossible for the Supreme Court to discharge the task of providing
significant appellate review of state-court interpretations of federal law. Thus the
holding, the language, and the overall tone of Grablesupport a broader role for lower
federal courts than the grudging older cases. At the same time, there must be
appropriate limits to ensure that federal question jurisdiction does not threaten either to
inundate the federal courts or to rob the state courts of their legitimate authority to
shape state law. I suggest that Grable, augmented by the types of considerations
relevant to the discretionary decline of supplemental jurisdiction and applied with
proper concern for state prerogatives, goes a long way toward achieving an appropriate
balance.
Just a year after deciding Grable, the Court addressed centrality in Empire
HealthchoiceAssurance, Inc. v. Mc Veigh. 5 Though the Court in this more recent case
could have been clearer in explicating its approach, the opinion is broadly consistent
with Grableand gives us reason to believe that we are closer today than we have been
to an apt and workable approach to the delicate allocation ofjudicial power between
state and federal courts for cases arising under federal law.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY GRANTS OF JURISDICTION
Our concern is the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction. Generally, of
course, federal courts have subject matterjurisdiction only over cases or controversies
included within the judicial power of the United States in Article III of the Constitution
and as to which Congress has enacted a statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction. In
other words, the federal judicial power created in Article III is not self-executing, and
Congress must vest it in the lower federal courts by statute.' 6 As a policy matter, we
expect constitutional authorization of subject matter jurisdiction to be broad. Breadth
gives Congress leeway in determining how much of the judicial power to bestow upon
the lower federal courts. If Congress is too parsimonious, it can remedy the problem by
statute, without need for constitutional amendment. Hence it does not surprise us that
the Framers employed broad language in Article III, such as that providing jurisdiction
for cases "arising7 under" federal law and for controversies "between citizens of
different states."'
Similarly, we expect statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction to be relatively
narrow, for Congress to pick and choose among available aspects of the constitutional

15. 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006).
16. There are narrow exceptions found in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, which provides
that in cases affecting ambassadors and similar officers, and in which a state is a party, the
Supreme Court has trial jurisdiction. These grants are self-executing; no legislation is required
to vest the power to determine such cases in the Supreme Court.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II1,§ 2.
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judicial power. In doing so, Congress presumably is mindful of the need to avoid
overloading the lower federal courts with the universe of cases that could
constitutionally be placed there. 18 In its choice of operative language in jurisdictional
statutes, though, Congress has seemed unaware of the policy difference between
constitutional and statutory provisions., 9 With both federal question and diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, Congress adopted verbatim the broad operative language from
the Constitution.20
The Supreme Court, and not Congress, has animated the policy of broad
constitutional authorization with narrow statutory grants. It has done so by interpreting
identical language to mean different things, depending upon whether the language is
found in Article III or in the Judicial Code. Properly, the Court interprets the
constitutional grants broadly.21 For diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the Court held
that the Constitution requires only "minimal diversity"--that at least one plaintiff be of
different citizenship from at least one defendant. 22 For federal question jurisdiction, the
Court early imbued the Article III phrase "arising under" with stunning breadth. In

18. Congress determines the number of federal judgeships, and thus presumably has a sense
of appropriate workload. Were it to expand federal jurisdiction dramatically, we would expect it
to increase the number ofjudgeships.
19. Perhaps I am too harsh here. Maybe Congress has intended to vest the full
constitutional extent of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., infra note 28. Or perhaps it has
intended to delegate to the federal courts the responsibility of setting the statutory limits.
Congress has understood the need for docket control to the extent that it has imposed amountin-controversy requirements in jurisdictional grants. It has always imposed such a limitation in
diversity of citizenship cases and has increased it several times; today it requires an amount in
excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000). Congress imposed a similar restriction on
cases invoking the general federal question statute from its inception in 1875, but abolished it in
1980. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 6, § 3562, at 17 ("After 105 years the anomaly of putting
a price tag on entrance to federal court by those seeking to vindicate federal rights is ended.").
But in terms of the operative language of the grants, Congress's use of the constitutional
language may demonstrate, as I suggest, blindness to the difference between constitutional and
statutory grants.
20. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution creates federal judicial power over claims
"arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority." Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction over all civil
actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000). This is also true of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, where Article III, Section 2
creates judicial power over cases "between citizens of different states" and § 1332(a)(1) requires
a dispute "between citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000).
21. In a nonjurisdictional context, John Marshall explained the appropriateness of broad
constitutional interpretation: "[W]e must never forget that it is a constitutionwe are expounding
...a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407-415 (1819)
(emphasis in original).
22. State Farm Fire& Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (upholding grant
of statutory interpleader jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity). This broad interpretation of
the constitutional grant of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has enabled Congress to enact the
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2002) and the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005), which base jurisdiction upon minimal
diversity.
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Osborn v. Bank of the United States, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John
Marshall, held that the Constitution requires only that federal law potentially "forms an
ingredient" in the overall litigation. 23 Under Osborn, the federal issue does not have to
be one of particular difficulty or importance to the outcome of the case. Indeed, the
federal issue does not even have to be contested. As a constitutional matter, federal
24
question jurisdiction can attach if any federal issue could come up in the case.
And the Court has interpreted the identically worded statutory grants narrowly. For
diversity of citizenship, the phrase "between citizens of different states" has, since
1806, required complete diversity-each plaintiff must be of diverse citizenship from
each defendant. 25 With federal question jurisdiction, however, the Court adopted
narrow statutory interpretation only after flirting with the alternative. In the Pacific
RailroadRemoval Cases,26 decided ten years after Congress passed the general federal
question statute,27 the Court equated the statutory grant for "arising under"jurisdiction
with that of Article III as explicated in Osborn.28 This meant that run-of-the-mill
common law tort actions against federally chartered railroads invoked federal question
jurisdiction. Because the validity of the railroad's formation (under federal law) might
conceivably be raised in any case involving such a railroad, the requisite federal
content under Osborn was present. 29 Three significant and closely related problems
must have come to light in short order.

23. 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824). In Osborn, the Bank of the United States sued to enjoin an
Ohio official from collecting taxes from it under an Ohio statute that provided for the taxation of

non-Ohio banks. The Bank contended that the Supremacy Clause ofthe Constitution prohibited
at 739-40, 744-45. That
the state from taxing an instrumentality of the federal government. Id.
federal issue satisfied the "arising under" requirement of Article III. Id at 824-26.
24. Professor Redish notes that the Court arguably narrowed the reach of Osborn in
subsequent cases. See 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.21. For our purposes, however, it is
certain that the constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction is broader than the statutory
grant.
25. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806).
26. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
27. Congress passed the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, Sec.
1, 18 Stat. 470. Before that, there were several specific grants of federal question jurisdiction for
particularized subject matter, such as patents and copyrights. But aside from a grant of general
federal question jurisdiction in the famous Midnight Judges Act of 1801, repealed in 1802 (U.S.
Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802)), there was no general federal question
jurisdiction until 1875. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 4, at 240.
28. There is actually reason to believe that Congress intended to vest the full constitutional
range of federal question jurisdiction in the 1875 statute. Senator Matthew Carpenter, who
sponsored the legislation, asserted that the "bill gives precisely the power which the

Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." 2

CONG.

REc. 4987 (1874). See Ray

Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdictionand Section 5, 18 TUL. L. REv. 263, 276-80 (1943).
Some scholars have noted, however, that Senator Carpenter was speaking broadly ofthe overall
bill, and not necessarily the federal question portion of it. RicHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAvID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYsTEM 857-58 (5th ed. 2003). It seems likely that those advocating this breadth in the statute
did not foresee the problems it would cause.
29. In dissent, Chief Justice Waite argued that "Congress did not intend to give the words
...in the act of 1875, the broad meaning they have when used by Chief Justice Marshall in the
argument of the opinion in Osborn." PacificRailroadRemoval Cases, 115 U.S. at 24 (Waite,
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First, this broad reading of the statutory grant threatened to smother the lower
federal courts. The mischief of the Pacific RailroadRemoval Cases would not be
limited to cases involving federally chartered railroads. As courts have frequently
pointed out, equating the statutory and constitutional definitions of "arising under"
would mean that every dispute over real property in the vast majority of states would
invoke federal question jurisdiction. 30 In each such case, the question of whether title
was validly derived from the United States could conceivably be raised. The breadth of
this floodgate is hard to imagine. Permitting every case in which a federal issue might
be raised to invoke federal question jurisdiction would do far more than create a
workload problem necessitating some means of docket control. The sheer volume of
cases would imperil the lower federal courts' ability even to function. It is not an
overstatement to say that the Court's retreat from Osbornas the statutory3 standard for
"arising under" was rooted ultimately in institutional self-preservation. 1
Second, employing the Osborn test would permit federal question jurisdiction when
there is simply no need for it. Unless a federal claim is asserted or some issue of
federal law is actually to be engaged in the litigation, why (absent diversity of
citizenship) 32 should there be a federal forum? Letting the tail of a potential federal
issue wag the jurisdictional dog in this way would engage the federal courts in cases
not requiring the expertise of the federal bench. Surely it is appropriate, in considering
the reach of jurisdictional statutes, to consider whether placing cases in the federal
courts serves the underlying purposes for which the jurisdiction was created.
Third, overly broad invocation of federal question jurisdiction threatens the
legitimate interest of the states in having their courts interpret state law. True, Article
III envisions concurrent jurisdiction in many instances. But to recognize federal
question jurisdiction when no issue of federal law will actually arise insinuates the
federal courts in cases involving only matters of state law. Absent diversity of
citizenship, there is no warrant for depriving state courts of exclusive authority over
such cases. Put bluntly, the federal courts are too busy and the state interests too
C.J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900) (noting that if
statutory and constitutional standards were coextensive, "every action to establish title to real
estate (at least in the newer States) would [invoke federal question jurisdiction]"); T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) ("If the ingredient theory of
Article III had been carried over to the general grant of federal question jurisdiction now
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there would have been no basis... why federal courts should
not have jurisdiction as to all disputes over the many western land titles originating in a federal
patent, even though the controverted questions normally are of fact or of local land law.").
31. Cf 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.30, at 103-32 ("[T]o give the federal question
statute a reading as broad as the one given the constitutional provision in Osborn would flood
the federal courts with countless cases totally unrelated to federal law.").
32. Cases invoking diversity of citizenship jurisdiction are governed, of course, by state
substantive law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Though diversity of citizenship
has been much criticized, the Founders envisioned the need for access to an independent federal
forum in diversity cases to avoid at least the fear of local bias in local courts. See generally
FREER, supra note 12, at 157-59. The Supreme Court continues to recognize this policy basis
for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. "The Court... has adhered to the complete diversity
rule in light of the purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for
important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553-54 (2005).
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important to countenance the broad placement of state-law centered litigation into
federal fora absent some need-a need rooted in the reasons for federal question
or the necessity of consistent and
jurisdiction: the vindication of federal rights 33
sympathetic interpretation of federal provisions.
Two aspects of federal jurisdiction exacerbate these problems and counsel restraint
in interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction. The first is the
defendant's right to remove a federal question case from state to federal court. 34 If the
plaintiff files a concurrent-jurisdiction case 35 in federal court, the defendant can do
nothing to trump that choice of forum. If the plaintiff files such a case in state court,
however, the defendant can remove it to federal court. Thus, a concurrent-jurisdiction36
case "will be litigated in state court only if both plaintiff and defendant so choose."
The second aspect of federal jurisdiction that exacerbates these problems is
supplemental jurisdiction. Finding that a claim arises under federal law allows the
federal court to entertain nonfederal, nondiversity claims that share a common nucleus
of operative fact with the federal question claim. 37 Again, we should worry about 38a
relatively small kernel of federal law forcing a state-law based case into federal court.
Congress and the Court learned a lesson from the Pacific RailroadRemoval
Cases.39 Congress largely overruled their result by removing jurisdiction over cases
involving most federally chartered corporations.40 The Court came to regard its holding
in those cases as an "unfortunate decision ' '4 and ultimately rejected Osborn in
construing the statute.42 In its stead, the Court imposed two significant restrictions: the

33. Professors Chadbourn and Levin long ago noted the need "to protect the lower federal
courts from a flood of litigation technically within the broad limits staked out by [ChiefJustice]
Marshall [in Osborn], but actually unrelated to the purpose of the Act." James H.Chadbourn &
A. Leo Levin, OriginalJurisdictionofFederalQuestions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 649 (1942).
34. As a general proposition, a defendant may remove any case falling within the original
jurisdiction of the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). There are statutory
exceptions to the right to remove diversity of citizenship cases. For instance, such a case cannot
be removed if any defendant is a citizen of the forum. § 1441(b). There are no such exceptions
to removal in federal question cases. If the case satisfies the statutory requirements for federal
question jurisdiction, and the defendant acts timely, the defendant can remove.
35. Any federal question case could be entertained in state court, except in those relatively
rare instances in which federal question jurisdiction is exclusive. FREER, supranote 12, at 19091 (listing examples of exclusive federal question jurisdiction, including patent infringement
and antitrust claims).
36. FALLONETAL., supra note 28, at 861.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (granting supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent of
Article III).
38. The federal court could refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims, inter alia, if questions of state law present novel or complex questions or would
predominate substantially in the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(2) (2000). See infra notes 14344 and accompanying text.
39. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
40. Under § 1349, federal question jurisdiction cannot be based upon incorporation by
Congress unless the United States owns more than half of the capital stock of the entity. 28
U.S.C. § 1349 (2000).
41. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959).
42. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 28, at 858 (noting that the PacificRailroadRemoval
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well-pleaded complaint rule and the centrality requirement. 43 When Congress reenacts
the jurisdictional statutes without undoing such judicial limitations-as it has done
throughout history4-the Court then may invoke traditional tenets of statutory
construction to conclude that Congress approved of the Court's interpretations of the
jurisdictional statutes. 45 In other words, when Congress fails to reject a court-imposed
restriction on jurisdiction, it is deemed to have ratified the restriction. In this way, these
Court-made restrictions on federal question jurisdiction have become "statutory"
limitations.46
The well-pleaded complaint rule and the centrality requirement are thus statutory
filters for the invocation of federal question jurisdiction. On the one hand, the filters
must not set the gate so wide as to replicate the inundation of federal courts and
invasion of state prerogatives seen when Osborn was the statutory limit. On the other
hand, the filters must not set the gate so narrow that the lower federal courts are unable
to realize the purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction. Though our primary
concern is the centrality requirement, our discussion will benefit from comparing it to
an antecedent filter, which will introduce the topic of "litigation reality."
II. THE WELL-PLEADED

COMPLAINT RULE AND LITIGATION REALITY

The first filter for determining whether a case invokes statutory federal question
jurisdiction is the well-pleaded complaint rule. Typified by the famous case of
Louisville & Nashville Railroadv. Mottley, 47 the well-pleaded complaint rule requires
that the federal content for a federal question case appear in the complaint; it simply
cannot be injected by another pleading. Moreover, in looking at the complaint, the
court is compelled to view only the plaintiff's claim, and not material extraneous to the
claim (such as an anticipated federal defense) to determine whether the case arises
under federal law. A "well-pleaded complaint," then, would not contain more than a
Cases "can no longer be regarded as authoritative" concerning interpretation of a federal
question statute); CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

105

(6th ed. 2002) ("The Osborn theory... has been rejected in construing the statute.").
43. As noted earlier, I will assume throughout this Article that a third Court-imposed
limitation on federal question jurisdiction, the substantiality requirement, is satisfied. See supra
note 5.
44. Congress occasionally increases the amount-in-controversy requirement in diversity of
citizenship cases under § 1332(a), but has not for 200 years tinkered with the operative "citizens
of different states" language. As noted in the text, it removed the amount-in-controversy
requirement in federal question cases under § 1331, but has not changed the operative "arising
under" language. See supra note 19.
45. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985)

(discussing the canon of construction with regard to interpretation of jurisdictional statutes).
Some commentators refer to this as the "inaction canon" of interpretation. See WILLIAM D.
POPKiN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (forthcoming 2007).
46. The same is true, of course, of the "statutory" requirement of complete diversity under
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
47. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The plaintiffs, who held lifetime free passes on a railroad, sued to

force the railroad to honor the passes. The defendant had refused because of a federal statute
prohibiting such passes. The plaintiffs' claim was for breach of contract. Id. at 150-51. Federal
issues (of whether the statute applied to the plaintiffs and, if so, was unconstitutional) were
matters of defense and thus could not support federal question jurisdiction. See id.
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claim; the court will ignore all else in determining whether federal question jurisdiction
is invoked.
One of the things the court ignores in applying the well-pleaded complaint rule is
litigation reality-that is, an assessment of the issues that actually must be addressed
when the court adjudicates the merits of the dispute. The rule admits of no exception
for cases in which the federal issue is important or as to which the federal bench's
interpretation would be salutary. Notice what this means. The well-pleaded complaint
rule often channels away from federal trial courts and into state courts cases in which
the only issues to be adjudicated involve interpretation or application of federal law.48
In Mottley, for instance, the only issues contested in the case were federal: whether a
federal statute prohibiting railroads from honoring free passes applied to the plaintiffs
and, if so, whether it deprived them of property without due process. 49 Because those
issues were rebuttals of anticipated defenses, however, the complaint did not invoke
federal question jurisdiction.5 0 These determinative federal issues had to be litigated in
the state-court system. 5 1 In such cases, the only possible review by an Article III
tribunal comes from the Supreme Court-in the unlikely event that it grants
discretionary oversight after a final ruling by the state's highest court. 2
To state the obvious, the well-pleaded complaint rule is a rule. As such, it "binds a
decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts. 53 And, like most rules, it has its pluses and its minuses. On the plus side, the
well-pleaded complaint rule is relatively easy to use 54 and, because it is applied early in
the case (looking only at the complaint), avoids the jurisdictional limbo that could
55
result if federal question jurisdiction could be based upon the defendant's assertions.
On the minus side, the well-pleaded complaint rule is a rough-hewn instrument. As we
just saw, it often rejects federal jurisdiction in cases in which the only litigable matters
will involve interpretation or application of federal law. But rules are blunt, because
they "capture[] the background principle or policy in a form that from then on operates
independently. A rule necessarily captures the background principle
or policy
56
incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness."

48. This assumes, of course, that there is no other basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
49. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 150-51.
50. Id. at 152-53.
51. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (defining discretionary Supreme Court review of state high
court decisions concerning federal law). Interestingly, the federal issues in Mottley proved to be
of such importance that the Supreme Court entertained the case on the merits after it had been
litigated through the state court system. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467
(1911) (ruling for the railroad).
53. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 58.
54. This is notoriously not the case when the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment.
Moreover, the rule creates anomalous results in various disputes over title to real property. See
generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 42, at 114-15. See also infra note 98.
55. "This bright-line rule prevents the disruption, to both the system and the litigants, of
shifting a case between state and federal fora in the middle of an action as federal issues arise or
fall out." Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading:A Doctrine in Search ofDefinition,76 TEX. L. REv.
1781, 1783 (1998).
56. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 58.
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It is precisely this rigid under-inclusiveness that has led many to criticize the wellpleaded complaint rule.57 But the rule has withstood all assaults. It is inconceivable that
the Supreme Court will jettison it. Far from retreating from the rule, in 2002, the
Court extended the rule to counterclaims. 59 Even Justice Brennan, who argued so
forcefully for federal question jurisdiction in MerrellDow,60 never tried to eviscerate
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 61 In fact, he praised it for performing an indispensable
docket-control function and for avoiding needless clashes between state and federal
courts. 62 With all its faults, then, the well-pleaded complaint rule "makes sense as a

quick rule of thumb. 63

57. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation,22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605,608-11 (1981) (arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule ignores
the defendants who claim immunity from suit based upon federal law); Donald L. Doernberg,
There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 597 (1987)
(containing the leading general criticism of the well-pleaded complaint rule).
58. I am astonished at the vehemence with which colleagues have urged me to take up the
cudgel and argue for the rejection of the well-pleaded complaint rule. I am sorry to disappoint
them, but stronger voices than mine have been heard on that score and have failed.
Pragmatically, the rule's sacrosanct status makes it all the more important that the centrality
requirement not replicate the blindness to litigation reality of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
See infranotes 75-76 and accompanying text. While it is true that assessing litigation reality in

the centrality inquiry cannot recapture those cases lost to state courts through the well-pleaded
complaint rule, I do not consider it realistic to argue for abolition of the well-pleaded complaint

rule.
59. In Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation, 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002), the Court

stated that:
[O]ur prior cases have only required us to address whether a federal defense,
rather than a federal counterclaim, can establish "arising under" jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, those cases were decided on the principle that federal jurisdiction
generally exists "only when a federal question is presented on the fact of the

plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint."... It follows that a counterclaim--which
appears as part of the defendant's answer-cannot serve as a basis for "arising

under" jurisdiction.
(citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). In my view, this extension of the well-pleaded complaint
rule is unfortunate and unwarranted.
60. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 818-32 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). I will discuss Justice Brennan's dissent in Part III.E.
61. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 n.9
(1983) ("It is possible to conceive of a rational jurisdictional system in which the answer as well
as the complaint would be consulted before a determination was made whether the case 'arose
under' federal law, or in which original and removal jurisdiction were not coextensive ....
Commentators have repeatedly proposed that some mechanism be established to permit removal
of cases in which a federal defense may be dispositive. But those proposals have not been

adopted.") (citations omitted).
62. "One powerful doctrine has emerged... -the 'well-pleaded complaint rule'-which as
a practical matter severely limits the number of cases in which state law 'creates the cause of
action' that may be initiated in or removed to federal district court, thereby avoiding more-orless automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts." Id.at 9-10.
63. Id.at 11.
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I do not praise the well-pleaded complaint rule; but neither can I bury it. For better
or worse, we are stuck with this rule. And it is roughly consonant with the view that the
purpose of federal question jurisdiction is to provide a forum for the vindication of
federally created claims. After all, under the rule, the court may look only at the
plaintiffs claim, and at no other aspect of the dispute. But the rule's blindness to
litigation reality should be bome in mind when we consider the centrality requirement.
If it is important to have access to federal courts for the interpretation of federal law,
and not only to vindicate federal claims, it will be important for the court at some point
to ascertain whether issues of federal law actually will be presented in adjudicating the
merits. Because the well-pleaded complaint rule does not allow such an assessment,
only the centrality requirement can do so. 64
III. CENTRALITY AND THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD
A. The Holmes Test for Centrality: Well-Pleaded Complaint Redux
The well-pleaded complaint rule addresses a question that can be answered yes or
no: is the federal element of the case injected by the plaintiffs claim? 65 The blunt
instrument of a rule works well enough for that inquiry. But the centrality requirement
addresses whether the plaintiffs claim is "federal enough" to justify invocation of
federal question jurisdiction. Centrality asks how much-an assessment ill-suited to a
cut-and-dried rule. It calls for a standardthat employs relevant factors to guide the
decision. A standard
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the
background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease
of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more
discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all
66
relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances.
We should not be surprised or disappointed, then, if the centrality inquiry does not
always yield litmus-like answers. The nature of the inquiry requires nuance and
balancing. Courts routinely engage in such assessments in other areas, even some other
jurisdictional areas.6 7 Curiously, though, when addressing centrality, courts and
commentators seem timid; they want to seize upon a hard-and-fast rule. 68 There may be

64. I do not suggest that the centrality requirement can overcome the effect of the wellpleaded complaint rule. That rule often channels cases presenting matters of federal law to state
court: those cases cannot be recaptured for federal courts by the centrality requirement. Rather, I
argue that we should not replicate one of the shortcomings of the well-pleaded complaint rule by
failing to assess litigation reality in applying centrality. Because the well-pleaded complaint rule
is sacrosanct, see supranotes 57-58, the only chance courts have to inject litigation reality into
the federal question equation is through centrality.
65. Again, many may question the wisdom of limiting the assessment to the claim, but as
discussed in Part II, that rule is not going to change. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying
text.
66. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 58-59.
67. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
68. In his concurring opinion in Grable, Justice Thomas pondered the Court's possible
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two explanations for this penchant. First, until the recent decision in Grable, the
Supreme Court had not done a good job of explicating the factors to be assessed in the
centrality equation. My hunch is that objections to the "minimum contacts" test for
personal jurisdiction waned after the Court gave meaningful guidance on what factors
ought to be considered in applying it. The same thing should happen here. Second, the
starting point for many (probably most)judicial discussions of centrality is itself a rule.
That starting point is Justice Holmes's "creation test" in American Well Works Co.
v. Layne & Bowler CO. 69 In that case, Plaintiff manufactured and marketed a water
pump. Defendant held a patent on a water pump and contended that Plaintiff's pump
infringed its patent. 70 Plaintiff sued in state court, alleging that its pump did not violate
Defendant's patent and that Defendant was driving away Plaintiff's customers by
threatening to sue for infringement anyone who bought Plaintiff's pump. 7 I Defendant
removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, but the
Court rejected jurisdiction. 72 Plaintiff's claim was that its business was harmed by
Defendant's conduct. How the harm was accomplished was immaterial. Thus the fact
that the conduct was related in some way to a patent did not make the claim "arise
under" federal law. Holmes explained: "[a] suit for damages to business caused by a
threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law.",7 3 The harm
alleged-damage to Plaintiffs business-was actionable only because state law made
it so. Thus, Holmes concluded, a suit "arises under the law that creates the cause of
action." 74 Because state law created the trade libel claim being asserted, the claim did
not arise under federal law.
The Holmes test is strikingly similar to the well-pleaded complaint rule, and
replicates that rule's principal shortcoming. 75 The well-pleaded complaint rule asks a
simple yes-or-no question: is the federal content found in the complaint? The Holmes
test asks the same sort of question: did federal law create the claim being asserted? The
well-pleaded complaint rule focuses only on the claim and ignores litigation reality. So
does the Holmes test. The well-pleaded complaint rule frequently funnels to state-court
cases in which the only contested issues concern federal substantive provisions. So
does the Holmes test. In American Well Works (as in Mottley), the only issues to be
adjudicated-whether Defendant's patent was valid and was infringed by Plaintiff's
pump-involved the application of federal law. The Holmes test, like the well-pleaded
complaint rule, is relatively easy to apply and affords a ready answer.

adoption of the Holmes test, expressly for the sake of certainty. Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320-21 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
FALLON ET AL., supra note 28, at 886 ("[I]s the game worth the candle?"); Linda R. Hirshman,
Whose Law is it Anyway? A Reconsiderationof FederalQuestion JurisdictionOver Cases of

Mixed State and FederalLaw, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1984) (proposing adoption of the Holmes test).
69. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
70. Id. at 258.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.

75. Indeed, the Holmes test renders the well-pleaded complaint rule unnecessary. Because it
requires a federally created claim, the Holmes test focuses only on the plaintiff's claim itself,
just as the well-pleaded complaint rule does.
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But simplicity and certainty are purchased at a price. The well-pleaded complaint
rule fails to recognize that important federal issues might be injected into a case by a
pleading other than the complaint. So too the Holmes test fails to recognize that
important federal issues can be raised in a state-created claim. We saw above that the
Court has characterized the well-pleaded complaint rule as a "quick rule ofthumb., 76 It
is inappropriate to employ an equally rough-hewn, blunt instrument for centrality; the
balance ofjudicial power between the federal and state courts would seem to call for
more sophistication. The Holmes test for centrality simply fails to provide a
counterbalance to the well-pleaded complaint rule's blindness to litigation reality.
The Holmes approach seems rooted in the notion that statutory federal question
jurisdiction exists to provide a forum for the assertion of federally created claims. No
one doubts that it does. The issue is whether federal question jurisdiction serves
another function. It does. The Founders envisioned federal question jurisdiction as a
means of providing for consistent and sympathetic federal court interpretation of
federal substantive provisions. 77 Does the Holmes test facilitate this broader function of
federal question jurisdiction? The answer would be yes ifthe adjudication of federally
created claims always turned on the interpretation of federal law and if the adjudication
of state-created claims always turned on the interpretation of state law. The Holmes
test seems to assume this congruence. In Holmes's view, every federally created claim
will invoke federal question jurisdiction and no state-created claim will-regardless of
whether federal issues will actually be raised in the adjudication. In other words,
Holmes intended his test as one for inclusion (what will invoke federal question
jurisdiction) as well as for exclusion (what will not invoke federal question
jurisdiction). 78 The problem, of course, is that the implicit congruence is not borne out
in the real world. Interestingly, when an assessment of litigation reality demonstrates
that the congruence will not exist, the Court has been willing to deviate from the
Holmes test.
B. Litigation Reality Trumps the Holmes Test as a Test of Inclusion
As a test for inclusion, the approach set out in American Well Works was
inconsistent with that which the Court had taken sixteen years earlier in Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter.79 In that case, federal law created a right to sue to determine
mining rights between adverse claimants.8 0 The federal law expressly instructed the

76. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11; see supra text
accompanying note 63.
77. See supranote 12. Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 533 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van

Doren ed., 1945) ("The mere necessity of uniformity in interpretation of the national laws,
decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes,

arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but contradiction and
confusion can proceed.").
78. See 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.31[2][a], at 103-35 (establishing the Holmes test
as the measure of exclusion).
79. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
80. Id.at 506. Professor Oakley has argued that the federal law at issue in Shoshone Mining

did not create a federal right of action until local claim processes were invoked. John B. Oakley,
FederalJurisdictionand the Problem ofthe Litigative Unit: When Does What "Arise Under"
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court hearing such cases to make its determinations on the basis of local mining
custom. The case was thus the reverse image of American Well Works: federal law
created the claim, but the outcome would hinge on the application of state law. Holmes
(who was not on the bench when Shoshone Mining was decided), we presume, would
have upheld federal question jurisdiction
because federal law created the claim asserted
81
by one miner against another.
But the Court rejected federal question jurisdiction in Shoshone Mining. It did so
after considering litigation reality and concluding that there was no need for federal
jurisdiction. Because adjudication would require only the interpretation and application
of local mining custom, there was no need for the expertise of the federal bench or for
solicitude for federal policies. And because local mining custom varies from place to
place, there was no need for uniformity. Thus, the Court explained, "a suit to enforce a
right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of the
[statutory] jurisdiction clauses." 82 There must be "a controversy between the parties in
regard to 83the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts
involved.,

The Court was undoubtedly right in Shoshone Mining.84 Recognizing federal
jurisdiction simply because a federal law created the claim would have elevated form
over substance. 85 It would have burdened the federal courts with disputes in which
there was no federal interest 86 and in which no federal expertise was required, and
would have robbed state courts ofjurisdiction over cases that presumably were of some
local import. Thus, the Court in Shoshone Mining appropriately tailored federal

FederalLaw?, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1829, 1841 n.63 (1998). The Court, in decisions before and after
Professor Oakley espoused his theory, has consistently discussed Shoshone Mining as a case in
which the claim was created by federal law. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Dame

Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 (2005); Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 814 n.12 (1986). In addition, most commentators appear to agree. See, e.g., WRIGHT &
supranote 42, at 106 n.21; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion,60 N.Y.U. L.
REv.543,568-69 (1985).
81. See 15 REDISH, supranote 12, § 103.31[2][b], at 103-36 ("[lIt... appears that under
Holmes's narrow test, there should have been federal question jurisdiction, and therefore, that
Shoshone Mining should have been overruled in American Well Works. Federal law was solely
responsible for the adverse claimant's right to sue, so the cause of action was clearly created
under federal law.").
82. Shoshone Mining, 177 U.S. at 507.
83. Id.(quoting Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199,203 (1877)) (emphasis
added).
84. See Shapiro, supra note 80, at 569-70 (praising Shoshone Mining as engaging in
appropriate statutory interpretation).
85. See 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.31[2][a], at 103-34.
86. The Court in Shoshone Mining "was properly concerned with the volume of litigation
which a contrary decision would have loosed upon federal trial courts." Cohen, supranote 4, at
903. Professor Mishkin reflected the sentiment by noting that allowing such claims in federal
courts "would place upon them-and many of the litigants-an unnecessary burden." Paul J.
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 162 (1953).
"Cases like Shoshone must have arisen with monotonous regularity at the turn of the century,
but the degree of federal interest in an outcome dependent on local custom was marginal at
best." Shapiro, supra note 80, at 570.
KANE,
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question jurisdiction to situations in which it was needed and would not unduly
interfere with state jurisdiction.
C. Litigation Reality Trumps the Holmes Test as a Test of Exclusion
In Shoshone Mining, the Court was willing to consider litigation reality to defeat
federal question jurisdiction over a federally created claim. The case raises the
possibility that a court should (notwithstanding Holmes) recognize federal question
jurisdiction over a state-created claim. And indeed the Court did so over Holmes's
objection only five years after American Well Works. In Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co.,87 Plaintiff owned stock in a corporation which was planning to invest in
bonds issued under the Federal Farm Loan Act ("FFLA"). 88 Missouri law forbade
corporations chartered in that state from investing in unlawful securities. 8 9 Plaintiff
sued the corporation in federal court to enjoin it from investing in the bonds,
contending that such an investment violated Missouri law because the FFLA was
unconstitutional. 90
Though state law created the claim, the Court upheld federal question jurisdiction.
As in Shoshone Mining, the Court focused on litigation reality, and said "where it
appears from the [complaint]... that the right to relief depends upon the construction
or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States... the District Court has
jurisdiction." 91 Adjudication of the state-created claim would require the trial court to
address whether the FFLA was constitutional. Thus, "the controversy concerns the
constitutionality of an act of Congress which is directly drawn in question. The
decision depends upon the determination of this issue." 92 The Court undoubtedly was
influenced by the gravity of the question-whether a federal bond issuance was
constitutional. One purpose of federal question jurisdiction is to provide a federal trial
forum to avoid possible hostility to federal programs. 93 Without federal question
jurisdiction, the issue would have been subject to conflicting outcomes in the state
courts, with ultimate clarity coming only when the Supreme Court could review a final
decision of a state high court. In the interim, the validity of the federal bonds might be
in serious doubt.
Justice Holmes dissented in Smith. Though he recognized that "it is desirable that
the question raised in this case should be set at rest," 94 Holmes was relentless in
focusing on the claim asserted, and in ignoring litigation reality. Thus, he asserted:

87. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
88. Id.at 195-97 (citing the Federal Farm Loan Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)).
89. See id.
at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90. Id.at 195.
91. Id.at 199.
92. Id.at 201.
93. "Another reason Congress conferred original federal question jurisdiction on the district
courts was its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of federal right ....[Tihis rationale
is, like the rationale based on the expertise of the federal courts, simply an expression of
Congress's belief that federal courts are more likely to interpret federal law correctly." Merrell
Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Smith, 255 U.S. at 213 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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[I]t is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the
United States. The mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a
criterion or test, when the law of the United States has no force proprio vigore,
does not cause95a case under the state law to be also a case under the law of the
United States.

Thus, to Holmes, there can be no federal question jurisdiction unless at least part of the
claim itself is created by federal law.
Smith was not decided on an entirely clean slate. Four years earlier, in Hopkins v.
Walker,96 the Court had upheld federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim to
remove a cloud from title to real property. 97 The Court engaged in little meaningful
discussion of the jurisdictional issue, but it is worth noting that adjudicating the claim
would unquestionably require the trial court to interpret a federal land grant. Litigation
reality thus indicated that determination
of a federal issue was unavoidable and
98
relevant to the outcome of the dispute.
D. Seeds of Confusion: Cases Through 1936
Thirteen years after Smith, in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,99 the Court
retreated from its consideration of litigation reality. There, Plaintiff sued his employer
in federal court for personal injuries, pursuant to the Kentucky employers' liability
statute. 00 The employer wanted to defend either on the basis of contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk.' 0 1The Kentucky law provided that an employer
could not raise either defense, however, if the employer had violated a statute "enacted
for the safety of employees."'' 0 2 Plaintiff claimed that the employer had violated the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts (FSAA) and thus could not raise either defense. 0 3 The
Court held that Plaintiff's claim did not arise under federal law. As a matter of
centrality analysis, the Court basically hewed to the Holmes creation test and ignored
litigation reality. (Holmes had retired from the Court two years earlier.) Thus the Court
concluded that the plaintiff "set forth a cause ofaction under the Kentucky statute, and,
as to this cause of action, the suit is not to be regarded as one arising under the laws of

95. Id.at 215 (emphasis added).
96. 244 U.S. 486 (1917).
97. See id.
98. Real property disputes can raise arcane well-pleaded complaint rule problems. Assume
the plaintiff has a state-law claim to land and that the defendant's competing claim is based
upon federal law. Under pleading rules, if the plaintiff sues to remove a cloud on title, the
complaint must set forth the competing claim and thus will properly inject a federal element.
This was the situation in Hopkins. If the plaintiff sues to quiet title, however, the pleading rules
do not require the plaintiff to plead the competing title. Accordingly, the well-pleaded complaint
in such a case would not inject a federal issue and could not invoke federal question jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912).
99. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
100. Id. at 208-09.
101. Id. at 210.
102. Id. at 212-13 (citing CARROLL'S Ky. STAT., 1930, § 820b-1 to 3).
103. Id.
at 208 (citing the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1,6, 8-11 (repealed
1994)).
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the United States."' 1 4 Had the Court been willing to look to litigation reality, it would
have found significant similarity to Smith-though the claim was created by state law,
the adjudication would turn entirely on whether the employer had violated the FSAA.
Accordingly, commentators generally assert, Smith and Moore are inconsistent and
cannot readily be reconciled.' 05
Why did the Court ignore litigation reality in Moore? In my judgment, the Court
was just sloppy. First, it should have rejected federal question jurisdiction on the basis
of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Plaintiff raised the federal issue as a way to rebut
an anticipated defense. In this regard, the case was indistinguishable from Mottley.106 If
this is correct, it is not surprising that the Court failed to assess litigation reality. As
discussed above, the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Holmes test for centrality
share a focus on the law that created the claim and a blindness to litigation reality. So
the Court got the right answer, but for the wrong reason. 107 Second, the jurisdictional
issue was raised in an odd way in Moore. The case invoked diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction; the question of whether the case also arose under federal law was relevant
to venue.10 8 Nonetheless, the Court treated Moore as a centrality case. As such, it left
the lower federal courts to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent approaches in Smith
and Moore. The task was rendered more difficult by the fact that the Court in Moore
did not even refer to Smith, let alone attempt to distinguish it.
Help should have been on the way in short order, as the Court's next effort came
only two years later in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian.10 9 Surprisingly,
however, the opinion in that case failed to cite either Smith or Moore, and did not
undertake to resolve their apparent inconsistency. In Gully, a national bank went into
receivership and transferred all of its rights and liabilities to another bank."10 By
contract, the successor bank was liable for state taxes, which were assessed in part on

104. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.31[3][b], at 103-39 ("In each, state law
provided the cause of action, but each still presented a significant issue of federal law; yet the
Court found jurisdiction in Smith and denied it in Moore."); Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State
Law in the FederalCourts, 83 HARv. L. REv. 289, 293 (1969).
106. In Mottley, Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. Assuming that Defendant would rely
upon a federal statute prohibiting railroads from giving free passes, Plaintiffs undertook to rebut
the federal defense in their complaint by alleging that the federal law did not apply to them (or,
if it did, that it was unconstitutional). Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
150-51 (1908). In Moore, Plaintiff sued under state tort law; because he worked in intrastate

commerce, federal law did not create a claim for him. See Moore, 291 U.S. at 214-15.
Anticipating that Defendant would assert a defense of contributory negligence or assumption of
the risk, Plaintiff undertook to rebut the defense by alleging that its violation of a federal
statutory standard rendered the two defenses unavailable to the railroad. Id. at 210.
107. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 28, at 882 ("[T]he Moore and Smith decisions can
readily be reconciled.... [B]ecause the federal issue... came in, as in Mottley, by way of reply
to a defense, Moore failed the well-pleaded complaint rule.").

108. Plaintiff had laid venue where he resided, which was at that time permitted under the
venue statutes only if the case were based solely on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Thus,
had the claim also invoked federal question jurisdiction, the Court would have concluded that
venue was improper. Moore, 291 U.S. at 217.
109. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
110. IdatIll.
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the shares of stock of the predecessor national bank." '1When the successor bank failed
to pay the tax, the state of Mississippi sued it in state court.1 2 The bank removed the
case to federal court.13 Because the state's power to tax the stock of the predecessor
bank derived from
a federal statute, the bank asserted that the state's claim arose under
4
federal law."
The Court rejected jurisdiction. Part of the opinion is consistent with the Holmes
test, where the Court notes that the cause of action, based upon the contractual
obligation to assume the debts of the predecessor bank, was state-created." 5 But in the
main, the opinion seems consistent with Smith in assessing litigation reality. On the
facts of the case, the Court concluded that the federal issue (whether the state could tax
the predecessor national bank) was merely "lurking in the background." ' 1 6 In Smith, the
legality under state law of the corporation's investment in the federal bonds could not
be assessed without determining the federal issue of whether the bonds were
liability for the
constitutional. In Gully, by contrast, the successor bank's contractual
7
state tax could be litigated without addressing the federal issue."
Through Gully, then, the Supreme Court had established this track record:
Case
Shoshone Mining
American Well Works
Smith
Moore
Gully

Law creating claim
Federal
State
State
State
State

Law to be interpreted
State
Federal
Federal
Federal
State

Arise under?
No
No
Yes
No
No

With this track record, the Court had left open significant questions, including the
viability of the Holmes test and potential reconciliation of Smith and Moore. After
Gully, the Court did not return to centrality for half a century, until its decision in
Merrell Dow.118 During the interregnum, lower courts generally followed the Holmes

111. Id.
112. Id.at 112.

113. Id.

114. id.(arguing that plaintiff "counts upon that statute in suing for the tax").
115. Id.at 114.
116. Id.at 117. On this point, the opinion contains some much-quoted language: to invoke
federal question jurisdiction, a right or immunity created by federal law "must be an element,
and an essential one,of the plaintiff's cause of action. The right or immunity must be such that it
given one construction or effected, and defeated if[it]
will be supported ifthe [federal law is]
receive[s] another." Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
117. Under Mississippi law, the tax was valid only ifexacted on the shares of the national
bank,and not on the bank itself.Id.at 116. Thus,"afinding upon evidence that the Mississippi
law has been obeyed may compose the controversy altogether, leaving no room for a contention
that the federal law has been infringed.... A dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far
removed from plain necessity, isunavailing to extinguish the jurisdiction of the states." Id.at
117.
118. During this period, the Court's federal question decisions generally focused on other
aspects of federal question jurisdiction, including the well-pleaded complaint rule and the
requirement of substantiality. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983).
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test as one of inclusion and were quite adrift on the question of when federal question
jurisdiction was appropriate for state-created claims.'1 9 Courts wanting to deny
jurisdiction could apply the Holmes test and cite American Well Works. Courts wanting
to find federal question jurisdiction could cite Smith and, to some extent, Gully. When
the Court returned to the question of centrality in MerrellDow, observers hoped that it
would resolve the unanswered questions and make sense of its track record.
E. Merrell Dow and the Suggestion of Discretion
In MerrellDow, Plaintiffs sued for personal injuries allegedly suffered because their
mothers had ingested Bendectin while pregnant with Plaintiffs. They sued in state court
and asserted only state-law claims.' 20 One of the claims was negligence per se, the
theory for which was that Defendant, which manufactured Bendectin, had violated the
2
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") by misbranding Bendectin.' 1
Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant's labeling violated the FDCA by
promoting the drug without providing adequate warning of potential dangers of its
use.122 This violation of the FDCA, Plaintiffs argued, constituted negligence as a matter
of law.' 23 Defendant removed the case to federal court under federal question
jurisdiction.124 The parties stipulated (and the Court accepted) that the FDCA does not
25
create a private right of action, so no federal claim could be asserted under that Act.1
Thus, the case presented a state-law claim (negligence per se), the resolution of which
would hinge on the interpretation of federal law (the FDCA regarding misbranding). It
seemed to present a clear choice between Smith and Moore.
126
The majority of five, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, rejected jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan, joined by three others, wrote a spirited dissent.' 27 The majority
opinion has found few fiends.128 For example, Professor Redish concluded that while
the cases from the early twentieth century "were by no means fully internally
consistent, it was not until the Merrell Dow decision129in 1986 that the Court's doctrine
degenerated into a significant state of uncertainty."'
In holding that the claim of negligence per se did not arise under federal law, the
majority made much of the fact that Congress had not created a federal right of action:

119. See generally 15 REDISH, supra note 12, at § 103.31.
120. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805-06 (1986).
121. Id. (citing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The dispute invoked no other basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction, such as
diversity of citizenship.
125. MerrellDow, 478 U.S. at 810.
126. Id.at 817.
127. Id.at 818-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 28, at 882-85; 15 REDISH, supra note 12, at §
103.31[4]; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 42, at 108-10; Patti Alleva, PrerogativeLost: The
Trouble with Statutory FederalQuestion DoctrineAfter Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1478
(1991).
129. 15 REDISH, supra note 12, § 103.31[1], at 103-33.
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We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an
element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should
be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state130 a claim
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'

To the majority, permitting federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim in such
circumstances would "flout" congressional intent. 131
This reasoning would seem to imperil Smith. After all, if the existence of a federal
claim is the sine qua non of federal question jurisdiction, the holding in MerrellDow is
tantamount to a return to the Holmes test: if there is a federal claim, there is federal
question jurisdiction; if there is no federal claim, there is no federal question
jurisdiction. But the majority went out of its way to stress that it was not overruling
Smith. Indeed, it purported to reconcile Smith and Moore.'32 The discussion of the
134
viability of those cases-both by the majority' 33 and in Justice Brennan's dissent is found in footnotes. Justice Stevens explained that the different outcomes in those
cases "can be seen as manifestations of the differences in the nature of the federal
issues at stake."' 13 5 While Smith concerned the constitutionality of"an important federal
statute," the federal
issue in Moore "did not fundamentally change the state tort nature
' 36
of the action."'
The embrace of Smith seems feeble, and one is left with the impression that the
majority, like Justice Holmes, envisioned federal question jurisdiction as permitting the
vindication of federally created claims, and rarely (if ever) more. On the other hand,
the majority's discussion of Smith and Moore did not hesitate to look to litigation
reality-to the issues requiring adjudication-and to the relative importance of the
federal interest, which are hallmarks of a subtler approach than the Holmes test. Still,
one is left to wonder what facts would lead the Merrell Dow Court to conclude that a
state-law claim could invoke federal question jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's dissent plainly embraced a broader role for federal question
jurisdiction, one in which the lower federal courts are needed to provide sympathetic
and consistent interpretation of federal substantive provisions. He explained:
Congress passes laws.., to shape behavior; a federal law expresses Congress'[s]
determination that there is a federal interest in having individuals or other entities
conform their actions to a particular norm established by that law. Because all laws
are imprecise to some degree, disputes inevitably arise over what specifically
Congress intended to require or permit. It is the duty of courts to interpret these

130. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817.
131. Id.at 812.
132. Seeid. at814n.12.
133. Id.
134. Id.
at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id.at 814 n.12 (majority opinion).
136. Id.
at 815. Justice Stevens then noted that the "importance of the nature of the federal
issue" explained why there is no federal question jurisdiction in cases such as ShoshoneMining.
Id. at 815 n. 12. Instead, I have argued that an assessment of litigation reality-what issues were
to be adjudicated by the trial court-explains the rejection of the Holmes creation test as a
principle of inclusion. In dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that Smith and Moore were
irreconcilable and that Moore should be overruled. Id.
at 821 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose is realized....
Congress granted the district courts power to hear cases "arising under" federal
law

. . .

to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be interpreted more

correctly and applied more uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that
the availability of a federal forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions
likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way that
would make it more137
Congress intended.
Justice Brennan was right to take the majority to task for its focus on a lack of a
federal remedy. He was also right to espouse a broader vision of the role of federal
question jurisdiction. In doing so, Justice Brennan made a remarkable admission: that
the Supreme Court, in 1986, had reached a point at which it simply could not discharge
its duty of ensuring consistent interpretation of federal law by exercising appellate
jurisdiction over state-court decisions. To him, an expanded view of statutory federal
question jurisdiction was necessary because the Court "realistically ...cannot even
come close to 'doing the whole job' of correcting erroneous state-court decisions in
that way. 138 While this admission strengthens the argument for federal question
jurisdiction in cases in which state-law claims present embedded federal issues, Justice
Brennan's conclusion (to uphold jurisdiction) is suspect in commonsense terms, for at
least three reasons.
First, as seen in the passage quoted above, Justice Brennan argued that the existence
of a federal scheme dealing with pharmaceuticals made it especially important to
recognize federal question jurisdiction. In fact, however, the existence of the FDCA
and the administrative apparatus supporting it might sometimes counsel against federal
question jurisdiction. That is, Congress might have refused to create a private right of
action under the FDCA precisely because administrative enforcement is available "to
shape behavior."'139 It is in cases like Smith, where lack of federal question jurisdiction
means that there can be no federal adjudicative tribunal, that courts might more
appropriately find jurisdiction over state-created claims.
Second, as a matter of litigation reality, it was overwhelmingly likely that the trial
court in Merrell Dow would not have had to interpret any provision of federal law.
Plaintiffs in Merrell Dow asserted several claims, all of which were created by state
law. In most of those claims, every issue to be adjudicated involved state law, on
questions such as breach of warranty, fraud, and negligence. One of the claims, as
noted, was for negligence per se, one basis for which was alleged to be violation of the
FDCA.In other words, plaintiffs could have recovered on every claim--including

dissenting). For example, various federal regulatory schemes
137. Id.at 828 (Brennan, J.,
empower a federal administrative agency to oversee implementation of relevant statutes, but do
not create a federal right of action. The agency typically has authority to initiate proceedings to
enjoin violations of the statutes and to request that the U.S. Attorney institute criminal
proceedings against those who violate the provisions. Justice Brennan seemed to envision
federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims based upon such federal provisions as helpful
in providing for uniform and sensitive interpretation and effectiveness.
138. Id. at 827 n.6 (Brennan J., dissenting); see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A
PoliticalCourt, 119 HARv.L. REv. 31 (2005) (discussing reduced number of formal Supreme
Court opinions rendered in recent years).
139. See MerrellDow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan J., dissenting).
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negligence-without establishing a single federal issue.' 40 In contrast, the trial court in
Smith could not have adjudicated the merits of that case without interpreting federal
4
law. '

This fact may suggest an important difference between federal question jurisdiction
over federally created claims and over state-created claims. When a plaintiff sues to
enforce a federal claim, jurisdiction attaches even ifthe only dispute is about the facts,
and even when there is no need for interpretation of federal law. 142 This is entirely
appropriate, of course, because
federal question jurisdiction exists to permit
143
enforcement of federal claims.
But the state-law claim is different. With it, federal question jurisdiction is exercised
(if at all) to promote the uniform and sympathetic interpretation of federal law and to
gain access to the expertise of the federal bench. This function is implicated only if an
issue of federal law necessarily must be adjudicated. Moreover, it augurs toward
jurisdiction in those cases in which the question is one of interpretationof federal law,
rather than merely a determination of underlying facts. Because it is not clear that a
federal issue would have been adjudicated in Merrell Dow, the Court was correct to
reject jurisdiction.144

Third, refusing to uphold jurisdiction in Merrell Dow was appropriate in terms of
federalism. States have an interest in how broadly federal courts exercise federal
question jurisdiction. To permit jurisdiction over a state-law claim because it might
require the adjudication of a federal issue grants federal jurisdiction when there is no
demonstrated need for it. As noted above, the mischief is exacerbated by supplemental
jurisdiction. In Merrell Dow, finding that the negligence per se claim arose under
federal law would have permitted the federal court to take subject matter jurisdiction
over all of the other state-law claims as well. Because they arose from a common
nucleus of operative fact with the "federal" claim, they would have invoked

140. The Sixth Circuit made this clear:
Plaintiffs' causes of action referred to the FDCA merely as one available criterion
for determining whether Merrell Dow was negligent. Because the jury could find
negligence on the part of Merrell Dow without finding a violation of the FDCA,
the plaintiffs' causes of action did not depend necessarily upon a question of
federal law. Consequently, the causes of action did not arise under federal law and,
therefore, were improperly removed to the federal court.
Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1985), a]t'd,478 U.S.
804 (1986).
141. To rule on the plaintiff's claim, the court would have to assess whether the federal law
by which the United States issued particular securities was constitutional. So too in Hopkins, the
trial court could not have ruled on the merits without interpreting the federal land grant under
which the defendant claimed title. See supranote 98.
142. See FALLON ETAL.,supra note 28, at 864 (stating that jurisdiction attaches insuch cases

"even when the only dispute between the parties is about the facts (or indeed when there is little
dispute about facts or law, as may be true, for example, when a default judgment is entered)").
143. Id. at 847 ("[A] further, constitutionally permissible function of federal courts is to
enforce federal law-to establish the facts determinative of the application of federal law even if
the law's content and applicability are undisputed, and to enter and enforce the appropriate
judgment.").
144. The case is thus reminiscent of Gully, in which any federal issue was merely "lurking in
the background." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936).
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supplemental jurisdiction.145 Packing so much state law into a dispute in federal court
(absent diversity of citizenship and absent a clearly litigable issue of federal law) is a
questionable use of federal judicial resources. It also improperly infringes on statecourt jurisdiction. MerrellDow involved product liability claims, a cutting-edge area of
tort law long entrusted to state-court development. The interests of federalism support
allowing the state courts to shape the development of that law.
Principles from the law of supplemental jurisdiction prove instructive here. Under
the discretionary factors goveming the exercise of that jurisdiction, a federal court
dismisses (or remands, if the case had been removed from state court) supplemental
claims if the state law issue is novel or complex or if state law would predominate
substantially in the adjudication of the case.146 In Merrell Dow, any federal issue, even
if actually presented in adjudication, would have been a very small part of the overall
case, and the lower court might have exercised its discretion to reject supplemental
jurisdiction over the other state-law claims. Perhaps this fact should counsel against
finding that the embedded federal issue invokes federal question jurisdiction in the first
place.
This discussion of what I have called commonsense reasons supporting the result (if
not the reasoning) in Merrell Dow clearly envisions some role for the district court's
exercise of discretion in assessing centrality. Leading scholars have concluded that the
majority opinion in MerrellDow--particularly the footnote discussing the viability of
Smith and Moore-marksthe first time the Court "explicitly indicated approval of any
notion of 'discretion' in interpreting § 133 1.,147 Indeed, the majority opinion "is
the 'arising under'
replete with hints that the Court wishes to reserve discretion to tailor
148
jurisdiction to the practical needs of the particular situation."'

145. The case was decided before the enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (enacted 1990) (granting supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent of
Article III). Supplemental jurisdiction would have been proper, however, under UnitedMine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (defining Article III limit on supplemental jurisdiction).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) ("[T]he claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law."); 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (state claim "substantially predominates" over claim or claims invoking
federal subject matter jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (allowing jurisdiction to be
declined when "exceptional circumstances" offer "compelling reasons" for doing so). Before the
enactment of § 1367 in December 1990, courts had discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction for similar reasons under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27
(1966). See FREER, supra note 12, at 212-14.
Above, I criticized Congress for being unaware of the difference between statutory and
constitutional grants ofjurisdiction, and suggested that perhaps that criticism was unduly harsh.
See supra note 19. Perhaps Congress demonstrates in § 1367 the sort of balance that Grable
brings to § 1331. While it is true that § 1367 deals with supplemental, and not original,
jurisdiction, both it and cases such as Grable address "mixed" cases, in which elements of
federal and state law coexist. Thus § 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction broadly and §
1367(c) employs discretionary factors to assess whether the state-law center-of-gravity
outweighs the jurisdictional grant. Similarly, an assessment of whether a state-law claim invokes
jurisdiction under § 1331 might employ similar center-of-gravity concerns.
147. FALLON ET AL., supra note 28, at 884. According to these scholars, the Court previously
"ha[d] based its decisions... on statutory interpretation, finding in a particular substantive
statute a congressional intent to create an exception to the usual § 1331 rules." Id. at 884-85.
148. Id. at 884. The Court cited works by academics embracing such discretion. Merrell Dow
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The problem is that the Court in Merrell Dow failed to speak meaningfully about
the scope of discretion or how to exercise it. The Court made much of "the nature ' of
49
the federal interest at stake," which it seemed to equate with "importance."'
Jurisdiction was proper in Smith because the case raised "the constitutionality of an
important federal issue."' 150 But was it the federal provision itself or the fact that it was
subject to constitutional challenge that made it important? And importance is a slippery
linchpin. But to whom is it important-the litigants, the federal government, or society
at large? And is it important for the purpose of the litigation or governmental function?
And what other factors, beside "the nature of the federal interest," are relevant?
In sum, though it reached the right result in Merrell Dow, the Court's analysis left
the lower courts at a loss, fundamentally in two areas. First, notwithstanding the
attempt to breathe life into Smith, the tenor of the opinion suggested that the existence
of a federal claim is the only way to invoke federal question jurisdiction. Second,
though the Court for the first time opened the door for an assessment of discretionary
factors in determining whether a claim "arises under," it did little to inform the exercise
of discretion. Proof that the guidance was flawed is provided by the subsequent
confusion in the lower courts; they failed to reach anything like accord on the meaning
of Merrell Dow. 511Because of this confusion, the Court returned to centrality in 2005.
F. Grable and the Emergence of a Standard
In Grable, the Court upheld federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim,
litigation of which would focus on an issue of federal law. 152 Grable, a corporation,
failed to pay its taxes, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seized its realty. After

Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n. 12. The academics' approaches to discretion
differed, however. Professor William Cohen refused to embrace an overarching analytical

framework and adopted instead an ad hoc, pragmatic assessment. Specifically, he asserted that
the centrality decision "requires inquiries and guesses" about such things as litigation reality, the
effect of finding jurisdiction on federal court caseload, and the need for federal expertise and
sympathy to federal policy. Cohen, supra note 4, at 916. Professor David Shapiro, on the other
hand, rejected this ad hoc approach in favor of more cabined discretion: "The discretion I
advocate relates primarily to... a range of permissible choices under the relevant ... precedent

to narrow the scope of discretion and even to generate predictable rules." Shapiro, supra note
80, at 588-89. He embraces a range of choices based upon "considerations of judicial
administration and the degree of federal concern." Id. at 568. Thus, Professor Shapiro notes,
jurisdiction was proper in Smith because it would not affect federal caseloads appreciably and
because the issue of whether the federally issued securities were valid was a question of "great
federal moment" to the federal government and to investors. Id. at 568-70. In contrast, there
was no federal interest in a case such as Shoshone, and finding jurisdiction would have flooded
federal courts. Id.
149. MerrellDow, 478 U.S. at 815 n.12.
150. Id.
151. "[C]onsiderable variation exists among and even within various circuits." FALLON ET
AL., supra note 28, at 885 (discussing cases). An example of the uncertainty engendered by
Merrell Dow appears in a study of courts of appeals opinions from the 1990s. In sixty-nine
opinions dealing with federal question jurisdiction under Smith, the appellate courts reversed
forty-five times. Note, Mr. Smith Goes to FederalCourt: FederalQuestion Jurisdictionover
State Law Claims Post-MerrellDow, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2272, 2280 (2002).
152. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g, 545 U.S. 308, 309 (2005).
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Grable did nothing to redeem the property, the land was sold to Dame. Years later,
Grable sued Dame on a state-law claim of quiet title.' 53 Grable asserted that the IRS
had not properly divested it of ownership because the IRS failed to give Grable proper
notice of the seizure of the property. Accordingly, Grable argued, Darue's record title
was defective.' 54 Grable conceded that it had actual knowledge of the seizure (because
it was served with notice by certified mail), but argued that the seizure was invalid
because federal law does not permit service of notice by mail. 155 Darue removed the
case to federal court, and Grable sought
remand. The lower courts upheld jurisdiction,
5 6
and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The opinion in Grable is immediately striking in two regards. First, it is
unanimous-a welcome relief from the harsh split in MerrellDow. Second is the tone
of Justice Breyer's opinion, which openly embraces federal question jurisdiction over
state-law claims. There is none of the stinginess of Merrell Dow, which relegated
discussion of Smith to a footnote. Early in the opinion, Justice Breyer forthrightly
states that the Court has recognized for nearly a century that "federal question
157
jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues."
He calls Smith "[t]he classic example" of such a case and unflinchingly embraces "the
commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized
under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus
justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum
offers on federal issues."' 58 That notion did not seem so "commonsense" in Merrell
Dow. Nor was the vitality of Smith-let alone its status as a "classic"-so plain in
1986.
Of course, not every state-law claim raising a federal issue can invoke federal
question jurisdiction. For one thing, as a matter of litigation reality, the federal issue
must actually be contested when the merits are adjudicated. But even this will not
guarantee jurisdiction. Read literally, the Court noted, Smith would permit federal
question jurisdiction whenever it appeared on a well-pleaded complaint that a "right to
relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law]."' 5 9 Subsequent
cases trimmed this view, for instance with the substantiality requirement. 6° Beyond
that, the Grable Court imposed a "veto": 161
"the federal issue will ultimately qualify for

153. Idat310-11.
154. Id.

155. Id.at 311. The statute relied on is 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2000) (written notice shall be
"given by the Secretary to the owner of the property... or left at his usual place of abode or
business"). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Darue on the merits, holding that service by certified mail satisfied the requirements of the
statute. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 377 F.3d 592, 593-94 (6th
Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the jurisdictional issue and thus did
not address the claim on the merits. Grable,545 U.S. at 311 n. 1.
156. 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Mich. 2002), afrd377 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2004), aff'd545
U.S. 308 (2005).

157. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1920))
(alteration in original).
160. See supranote 5.
161. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
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a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment
about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the
application of § 1331 .,,162 In other words, "there must always be an assessment of any
disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction."'163 Even if it is desirable to have a
federal forum to address a federal issue, Grable requires a court to assess whether
accepting jurisdiction will skew the allocation of judicial power "drawn (or at least
assumed) by Congress."' 164
This is something new, at least as an express factor. In MerrellDow, the Court had
somewhat timidly suggested that the "nature of the federal interest" is relevant. It
discussed that factor, though, in terms of the "importance" of the federal issue
presented, without much explanation.' 65 By injecting overt consideration of the
allocation of judicial power, the Court in Grable opened the door to a variety of
factors, including the interests of the federal and state judicial systems. The Court
assessed three factors under the rubric of this possible "veto." I believe these to be the
focus of Grable'scentrality analysis.
First, the Court considered litigation reality. Grable's claim to superior title was
based on the IRS's failure to give proper notice. Thus the "meaning of the federal
statute" was "an essential element" and the "meaning of the federal statute [was]
actually in dispute."' 6616 7Indeed, it "appear[ed] to be the only legal or factual issue
contested in the case."'
Second, the Court declared that the meaning of the IRS provision "is an important
issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court."'' 68 In making this point,
the Court noted not only that the outcome of the litigation would hinge on the meaning
of the federal statute, but that the United States-though not a party to the litigationhas a strong interest in having federal trial courts available to determine this issue.
After all, the type of notice required for IRS seizures will affect the government's
ability to seize property to collect taxes.
And third, because few title cases will feature a contested issue of federal law,
"will portend only a microscopic effect on
recognition of federal question jurisdiction
' 69
the federal-state division of labor."'
With Grable, it is clear that state-law claims can invoke federal question
jurisdiction. It is also clear that Smith is not limited to constitutional cases, but can be
invoked in cases in which the embedded federal issue is statutory.170 And it is obvious

not only can overzealous invocation of federal
162. Id. at 313-14. As discussed in Part II,
question jurisdiction threaten inundation of the federal courts, it threatens improper invasion of
state-court jurisdiction as well.
163. Id. at314.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
166. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id.The Court contrasted the situation in Merrell Dow: "[flor if the federal labeling
standard without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any
other federal standard without a federal cause of action. And that would have meant a
tremendous number of cases." Id.at 318.
170. "[A] flat ban on statutory questions would mechanically exclude significant questions
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that a court must look to litigation reality to ensure that the federal issue will actually
be adjudicated when the court reaches the merits.
Grable eschews the use of a rule and prescribes a standard for assessing centrality.
It provides factors to allow the lower federal judge to assess whether a state-law claim
invokes federal question jurisdiction. However, because a standard "tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy
to a fact situation," it is imperative that the judge understand why she is applying the
factors.171 In Grable, the Court finally states a theory for federal question jurisdiction
over state-created claims. Specifically, it recognizes a need for "resort to the
experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal
issues."' 72 The Grable factors must be considered against this guiding principle. We
turn now to consider the application of this principle, including the173Court's recent
effort to do so in Empire HealthchoiceAssurance, Inc. v. Mc Veigh.
G. Applying the Standard
Assume that a well-pleaded complaint asserts a state-law claim that raises a federal
issue. How does a court apply Grable to determine whether the claim satisfies the
centrality requirement and invokes federal question jurisdiction? Again, the
overarching question is whether the case is one that justifies "resort to the experience,
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues."' '74 To
determine this, Grable counsels that courts look to three factors, 75 which I propose
now to consider in detail.
Initially, as a matter of litigation reality, the federal issue must actually be in
dispute. 176 In Grable and Smith, this was easy, because the only questions presented for
adjudication required interpretation of federal law.177 In Merrell Dow it was not clear
that the federal issue would arise; the case could have been litigated without deciding
the FDCA question. Invoking federal jurisdiction, and robbing state courts ofexclusive
jurisdiction, simply cannot be justified (absent diversity of citizenship) because some
federal issue might come up. The federal issue must be unavoidable.
But does the federal issue have to be the only disputed question on the merits?
Suppose, for instance, that adjudication will require the court to address an issue of
federal law and an issue of state law. The Court has used language supporting
jurisdiction when federal law is "an essential element" of the claim, 178 and upheld
of federal law like the one this case presents." Id. at 320 n.7.
171. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 58.
172. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. "The Government ...
has a direct interest in the availability of
a federal forum to vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well as tax
delinquents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to federal tax matters." Id. at 315.
173. 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006).
174. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. See supra note 171.
175. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312-15.
176. Id.at 312-13 ("Darue was entitled to remove the ...action if Grable could have
brought it in federal district court originally.., as a civil action 'arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States'....") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
177. In Smith, the sole question was whether the federal bond issue was constitutional. See
Smith v. Kansas City Title &Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 194-95 (1921). In Grable,the court had
to decide whether the applicable statute permitted notice by mail. Grable,545 U.S. at 311-12.
178. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315.
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jurisdiction when the federal issue was "dispositive" or "at the heart of the state-law
claim."'179 On the other hand, the leading examples of federal question jurisdiction over
a state-law claim (Smith and Grable) were cases in which the federal issue was the sole
focus of the contest. So long as the federal issue affects the outcome on the merits, it
would seem appropriate to exercise jurisdiction even if state-law issues are to be
decided as well.180
In assessing litigation reality, should it matter whether the federal issue is one of law
or of fact? In Smith and Grable,the issue presented was one of law. Again, the goal of
this branch ofjurisdiction is to provide "resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope
of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues."' 18 That goal may be
implicated most directly when the task is interpretingfederal law. While it is routinely
said that federal question jurisdiction exists to provide a federal forum for "the
construction or application" of federal law, 182 I am suggesting that the task of
construction is more important than the task of application in cases involving state-law
claims. We saw above that cases seeking vindication of federal claims invoke federal
question jurisdiction even if no issue of federal law will actually be encountered in
adjudication. And we noted that this was appropriate to the mission of the federal
courts of vindicating federal claims.' 83 So litigation ofpurely factual issues arising in a
federal claim is appropriate in federal court. Litigation focusing purely on factual
issues concerning federal law seems less compelling.
Suppose, for example, that in a case appealed from a state court, the Supreme Court
had determined definitively the legal question in Grable. Thus, the federal law
concerning notice to be given to tax delinquents was clear. Then Grable sued Darue.
Would the claim invoke federal question jurisdiction? The plaintiff would be asserting
a state-law claim in which the definitive outcome is governed by federal law. But the
only question to be litigated would be factual-whether on the facts the now-clear
federal standard is met. There may be an argument that a federal judge will apply the
facts to the law with greater care or sympathy than a state judge, but (especially if the
facts are determined by a jury) the case for federal question jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts does not seem strong.
On the other hand, consider what will happen after Grable.With federal question
jurisdiction, let us assume that the lower federal courts hold uniformly that the federal
law permits the IRS to give notice to tax delinquents by mail. Thereafter, does every
quiet title case in which the IRS gave notice by mail invoke federal question
jurisdiction? Presumably the answer must be yes. Perhaps one can argue that
jurisdiction does not attach because the federal issue, once clarified, does not meet the
substantiality requirement. If that is so, however, we are essentially saying that a claim
arises under federal law only so long as the federal law is not clearly established. That
is tantamount to saying that we have federal question jurisdiction not over cases arising

179. Id. at 320.
180. See Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 435 F.3d 666,678 (6th Cir. 2006) (Daughtrey,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's rejection ofjurisdiction under Grableby noting, interalia,
that "determining whether the defendants complied with the [Internal Revenue] Code is
essential to a resolution of the plaintiffs' claims").
181. Grable,545 U.S. at 313; seesupranote 171.
182. Smith, 255 U.S. at 199.
183. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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under federal law, but over interesting questions, and only so long as they are
interesting, which cannot be right. So Grableapparently portends that any future quiet
title suit involving a claim that the IRS failed to give proper statutory notice to a
delinquent will invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if the only question to be
addressed is one of fact. If that is so, courts should be especially wary of finding
federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent a need for interpretation of
federal law.
I am not suggesting that there is no federal interest in having federal courts available
to apply federal law after the meaning of that law has been clearly established. In
Smith, the United States had an obvious interest in having federal courts decide
whether the federal bond issue was constitutional. Even after that issue was decided,
the government might worry that state judges, with jaundiced views of federal power,
would not apply the clear law with appropriate sympathy and consonance to federal
goals. At worst, such state-court hostility could imperil the government's ability to
finance its operations. So with Grable, the IRS would probably like to have access to
federal court to apply a clear law that underlies its ability to enforce and collect
judgments for tax delinquency. I simply suggest that courts, in determining whether a
state-law claim should invoke federal question jurisdiction, consider that rather
mundane questions of the application of federal law will now gain entry to the federal
courts. Courts should assess whether the long stream of potential cases involving mere
application of clear law should have access to a federal forum.
Beyond litigation reality, Grablecounsels courts to determine the "importance" of
the federal issue in question. Specifically, the Court concluded that the meaning of the
IRS notice provision "is an important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a
federal court." 184 In explaining this point, the Court combined aspects of litigation
reality-noting that the outcome of the litigation would hinge on the meaning of the
federal statute-with an assessment of whether the "meaningof the federal [law]" that
is important. 185 But it is impossible to say that something is important without asking:
"to whom?" Obviously, importance is not limited to litigants. Indeed, the principal
significance of the federal law in Grablewas to the federal government. Though it was
not a party, the IRS had a "direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to
vindicate its own administrative action.' 8 6 The federal government was not the only
one with an interest, however. The Court expressly noted that tax delinquents and those
who acquire property from them "may find it valuable to come before judges used to
federal tax matters."' 7 Smith is consistent. Certainly the federal government, though
not a party, would desire that the constitutionality of a federal bond issue be
determined in lower federal courts instead of state fora. So too the litigants would
presume that a federal judge would have greater facility with matters of federal
securities issuance and constitutionality.
Finally, Grable requires that the exercise of jurisdiction not upset the
"congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."',88 on
this score, of course, the Court is asking for a survey of the nonexistent. It is not clear

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Grable,545 U.S. at 315.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at314.
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that Congress assesses this balance when it enacts substantive provisions that are
unaccompanied by federal causes of action. As discussed in Part I, the courts have
always done the heavy lifting in determining which "statutory" limitations to graft onto
jurisdictional enactments. And courts will surely have to make the determination ofthe
appropriate balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.
The Court said little about the factors to be addressed in determining this balance.
Its discussion of illustrative cases and some common sense, however, suggest that a
court must consider the caseload impact of recognizing federal question jurisdiction on
both federal and state courts. 189 Grablewill add very few cases to the federal docket
and displace very few from state tribunals, because most title disputes will not involve
IRS seizure. In contrast, recognizing jurisdiction in Merrell Dow or in Moore would
have invited a massive influx of tort cases into federal court. A shift so potentially
massive must give the federal courts pause because it raises the welter of problems
seen with the Pacific RailroadRemoval Cases.
A state's interest in developing its own state law deserves equal attention. The Court
in Grablenoted that upholding jurisdiction in MerrellDow "would ... have heralded a
potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts."' 90 But the
case is even stronger than the Court suggested. MerrellDow was not a run-of-the-mill
tort case calling for application of well-known common-law principles. Rather, it was a
product-liability action, raising cutting-edge theories generally entrusted to state-court
development. Yes, permitting the claim in Merrell Dow to invoke jurisdiction would
have flooded the federal courts. But, it would also have robbed the state courts of the
ability to develop its law in this field. As discussed above, finding federal question
jurisdiction in that case would have moved the entire matter (perhaps including all
state-law issues, under supplemental jurisdiction) to the federal courts. This, in turn,
would present plaintiffs' counsel with a difficult choice. A lawyer desiring to litigate
such a case in state court could do so only by eschewing any possible federal issue. In
Merrell Dow, that would have meant foregoing a perhaps-meritorious claim of
negligence per se based upon violation of federal law. Had jurisdiction been upheld in
Merrell Dow, the plaintiff who pursued the negligence per se claim would lose her
state forum altogether when the defendant removed the case. The Grableinstruction to
consider the "congressionally approved balance" ofjurisdiction between federal and
state courts must include appropriate consideration of the importance of permitting
state courts to maintain control of their ability to develop state law. 191 Again, as the
preceding section suggests, the sorts of discretionary factors relevant to a decision to
decline supplemental jurisdiction are relevant here. They are aimed at determining
whether the center of gravity of the case is so overwhelmingly state oriented that state
courts ought not be robbed ofjurisdiction.
Grablewas the Court's first serious discussion of federal question jurisdiction over
a state-law claim in the nineteen years after Merrell Dow. Interestingly, only one year
passed before the Court encountered an occasion to apply Grable. Empire
Healthchoice involved the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 195992
("FEHBA"), which established a health insurance program for federal employees.'

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 313-14, 319.
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121,2126 (2006) (citing
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Under the Act, the Office of Personnel Management contracts with private carriers to
provide health-care plans to federal employees. 193 One such carrier is Empire
Healthchoice ("Empire"), which was the provider for enrollee McVeigh. McVeigh was
injured and received medical care for which Empire paid benefits of$157,309.194 The
FEHBA preempts state law on questions involving "coverage or benefits" but is silent
on the rights of carriers to sue for reimbursement or subrogation. 95 By contract,
however, Empire agreed to make reasonable efforts to recoup amounts paid for
medical care, and the benefits plan was required to reimburse the carrier for benefits
paid from any recoveries from third parties. 196 After McVeigh died, his widow sued
third parties in state court in tort for damages for McVeigh's personal injuries; she
recovered a settlement of over $3,000,000, from which Empire claimed that it was
entitled to recoup the benefits it had paid. Empire sued in federal court, alleging breach
of the reimbursement provision of the plan and demanding recovery of $157,309.
entitled to offset costs or to attorney's
Empire also asserted that Mrs. McVeigh was not
97
fees in recovering the state-court settlement. 1
The lower courts held that Empire's claim did not invoke federal question
jurisdiction. 198 The Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-four decision. 19 9 The Court
considered and rejected three theories ofjurisdiction, of which the third is relevant to
our discussion. First, it held that there was no basis for federal common law, and thus
that the claim asserted was not federal.200 Second, it held that the preemption provision
of the FEHBA did not render Empire's claim for reimbursement a claim created by
federal law. Finally, it applied Grable to conclude that the state-law reimbursement
claim for breach of contract did not invoke federal question jurisdiction. 20 1 Empire, and
the United States as amicus curiae, argued that the claim arose under federal law
pursuant to Grable because federal law was a necessary element to the reimbursement
claim. They were short on specifics, however, of what federal law was implicated.20 2
The Court likely reached the right answer in Empire Healthchoice,but it did not
expressly address the factors identified in this Article's preceding discussion of Grable.
Still, the Court addressed most of the factors and validated some of the preceding
observations about what those factors mean.
This Article has made two suggestions: first, as to litigation reality, a court should
assess the likelihood that the federal issue will be encountered; and second, that federal
question jurisdiction might be more compelling for questions of law rather than
application of clearly established law to fact. The opinion in Empire Healthchoice
bears out both aspects of litigation reality. For one, it is not at all clear that
adjudication of the merits required any assessment of federal law. Mrs. McVeigh

the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) of 1959, 5 U.S.C. § 8901 (2000)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2129-30.
195. Id. at 2127-28.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2129-30.
198. Id. at 2130.
199. Id.at 2127.
200. Id. at 2130-33. The dissent focuses entirely on this issue. Id. at 2138-44 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
201. Id. at 2136-37.
202. Id. at 2131.
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apparently agreed that Empire was entitled to reimbursement from her settlement fund,
but only for those payments relating to the injuries for which she had brought the statecourt tort suit. In other words, the litigation would focus in significant measure on how
much of the $157,309 paid by Empire was for injuries caused by the third-party
tortfeasors. These are fact-based and case-specific issues. The desire for federal
expertise and sympathy for federal policy are not implicated as readily as they would
be in a case requiring interpretation of federal law. The Court contrasted the situation
to Grable, which "presented a nearly 'pure issue of law,' one 'that could be settled
once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.' 20 3 Moreover,
though there was a question of law as to whether reimbursement should be offset to
take account of costs and attorney's fees expended by Mrs. McVeigh in the tort case, it
was a nonstatutory issue, which, the Court implied, might not be governed by federal
law. 204 Thus, an assessment of litigation reality did not support federal question
jurisdiction in Empire Healthchoice.
In discussing the "importance" of any federal issue, we noted above that Grable
looked to whether the federal government-though not a party-would benefit from
lower federal court treatment of the federal issue. In EmpireHealthchoice,the Court
goes beyond, and notes that Grable"centered on the action of a federal agency.., and
its compatibility with a federal statute." 20 5 In contrast, the reimbursement claim in
Empire Healthchoice "was triggered, not by the action of any federal department,
agency, or service, but by the settlement of a personal-injury action launched in state
court., 20 6 Though I would not rule out the possibility that a federal provision can be
"important" even if the government is not the one primarily interested in its
interpretation, it is clearly appropriate to consider the government's interest. In Smith,
as we have seen, the federal government, though not a party, was primarily interested
in determination of the issue of whether its securities issuance was valid. In Empire
Healthchoice,in contrast, the Court recognized the government's interest in attracting
able workers and providing for their health care, but was not convinced that state-court
jurisdiction over contract-based reimbursement claims would affect that interest.
Grable counseled that a court review the appropriate balance between federal and
state judicial systems, which includes an assessment of caseload impact and federalism
concerns. In EmpireHealthchoice,the Court does not quote the relevant language from
Grable and addresses the issue only in passing. 20 7 The lack of rigor in applying the
factors from Grable-especially just one year after that decision came down-is
disappointing. Still, the Court's conclusion seems unassailable and is consistent with
the standard established in Grable. At the end of the day, we know that state-law
claims can invoke federal question jurisdiction, we know why that is, and we have a
workable package of discretionary factors for undertaking the assessment.

203. Id. at 2137 (quoting FALLON ET AL., supranote 28, at 65 (2005 Supp.)).
204. Id. ("[lit is hardly apparent why a proper federal-state balance would place such a
nonstatutory issue under the complete governance of federal law, to be declared in a federal
forum.") (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 2138.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 2136-37.
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IV. RULES AND STANDARDS AND THE NEED FOR PREDICTABILITY

The two principal "statutory" filters for determining whether a case invokes federal
question jurisdiction combine a rule with a standard. The well-pleaded complaint rule
is a cut-and-dried prescription. It takes no heed of litigation reality and often channels
federally focused litigation into state court. For such cases, Article III review can come
only in the unlikely event that the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case after it wends
its way through the state judicial system. But the rule is well established, relatively easy
to use, and generally consonant with the view that federal question jurisdiction exists to
vindicate federal claims.
The well-pleaded complaint rule tells the courts little, however, about the federal
character of the claim asserted. That task falls to the centrality filter. Though many still
clamor for application of the Holmes test for centrality, that test just does not work. It
is a rule, as rough hewn as the well-pleaded complaint rule. It replicates the litigation
blindness of the well-pleaded complaint rule and channels an even greater number of
federally focused cases into the state courts. Together, the well-pleaded complaint rule
and the Holmes test realize only the potential of federal question jurisdiction to
vindicate federally protected rights. They fail to facilitate the broader vision of federal
question jurisdiction to ensure a federal trial forum, with federal expertise, for the
sensitive interpretation of federal law, free from state-court biases.
In fairness, perhaps in Holmes's day it was enough to funnel federally created
claims into federal court. Surely then there were far fewer situations in which statecreated claims contained embedded federal issues. For one thing, there were far fewer
federal laws then, thus presenting fewer occasions for incorporation of federal
substantive law into state causes of action. For another, in Holmes's day, the Supreme
Court was better able to review state-court interpretations of federal law. Today, as
Justice Brennan candidly admitted in his dissent in MerrellDow, the sheer volume of
litigation makes it unlikely that the Court can discharge this function. 208 Thus the need
for lower federal court jurisdiction over state-law claims that implicate federal
prescriptions is greater today than in Holmes's time. Grableexpressly recognizes this
need and embraces an appropriately broad view of federal question jurisdiction.
Those who counsel adoption of the Holmes test for centrality are worried, properly,
about predictability. Certainly, jurisdictional prescriptions should be as clear as
possible; no litigation seems as wasteful as that aimed at whether the parties are in the
right court. But as Professor Shapiro demonstrated so compellingly two decades ago,
many jurisdictional assessments involve the application of discretion. 2° 9 With Grable,
there is more certainty in the centrality assessment than we had before. Moreover, it is
worth remembering that cases such as Smith and Grable are pretty rare. Indeed,
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Grablestandard should result in
four broad categories of cases, with any uncertainty from the Grabletest limited to the
fourth.

208. See Merrell Dow Pharns. Inc. v. Thomspon, 478 U.S. 804,827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
209. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 545-70; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and
Discretion Revisited, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1891 (2004) (discussing Professor Shapiro's
article and its impact).
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First, the well-pleaded complaint rule will continue to channel to state court all
cases in which issues of federal law are injected by a defense (asserted or anticipated)
or a counterclaim. So, for example, cases like Mottley cannot invoke federal question
jurisdiction. Supreme Court appellate review of such cases is the only tool (and a weak
one at that) permitting an Article III court to police the interpretation of federal issues
injected into a case in ways other than through the plaintiff's claim.
Second, cases in which federal law creates the plaintiff's claim will almost always
invoke federal question jurisdiction. If we must bow to Holmes, we can say that the
Holmes test is "more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within
the district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond
district court jurisdiction." 210 There is nothing wrong with using the Holmes test as a
presumption in such cases. Indeed, it undoubtedly accounts for the vast majority of all
federal question cases.
Third, there will be a small number of cases, however, in which the plaintiff asserts
a federal claim but in which no federal issue will be addressed and in which there is no
federal interest in assuming jurisdiction. The leading example of this category, of
course, is Shoshone Mining, which demonstrates that even as a principle of inclusion,
the Holmes test is subject to being trumped
by a subtle assessment of litigation reality
21
and the need for lower federal fora. 1
Finally, there are the cases in which the plaintiff asserts a state-law claim that
implicates federal law. It is here that Grable applies. In my view, Grable does not
countenance an indeterminate ad hoc jurisprudence. Rather, it seems likely that cases
will fall into rather discernible categories. In some cases, such as those similar to
Grable and Smith, there will be minimal docket impact on either federal or state-court
systems, and a clear need to have lower federal courts address an issue of federal
import on which the country should not await Supreme Court appellate review. In other
cases, similar to Moore and possibly Empire Healthchoice, recognizing federal
jurisdiction would flood the federal courts with fairly routine common-law actions
presenting a federal issue on which state-court determination may be acceptable, with
Supreme Court appellate review available if needed. Indeed, American Well Works
would fall into this category; state courts already routinely address the types of federal
issues that were presented in that case, demonstrating that a federal trial-court forum is
not always of great importance.
Rather than throwing the centrality assessment into chaos, the standardset forth in
Grable seems workable and appropriate. Again, I suggest that federal courts be
sensitive to the sorts of factors relevant to the discretionary decline of supplemental
jurisdiction. Doing so will help ensure that the federal tail does not wag the state-law
dog.

210. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,9 (1983)
(quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964)).
211. See, e.g., Bell & Beckwith v. IRS, 766 F.2d 910, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1985) (denying
federal question jurisdiction for a claim arising under the Internal Revenue Code, because the
only issue to be litigated was a question of state lien law).
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CONCLUSION

After Grable,the federal courts have an apt system for determining whether a case
satisfies the statutory standard for "arising under" federal law. The system uses a hardand-fast rule to do what a rule can do--that is, answer a yes-or-no question. And it uses
a standard to do what rules cannot do well-that is, address a question calling for
balance and nuance. At the end of the day, the statutory definition of "arising under" is
in better shape now than it has been in a generation, which should put to rest any latterday calls for a return to the Holmes test for centrality. This improved state of affairs is
only possible because the Court has finally unequivocally embraced the notion that
federal question jurisdiction exists for more than one purpose. In addition to providing
an Article III forum for the vindication of federally created rights, it also serves to open
the lower federal court doors to claims requiring application or interpretation of federal
law. This function reflects the reality that the Supreme Court cannot today perform that
task through its appellate review of state-court decisions. And it is discharged only with
a sensitive balancing approach reflecting the delicate task at hand-that of allocating
judicial power between separate sovereigns. Finally, with Grable,we know why we are
undertaking the centrality assessment.

